Current Status of Personal and General Jurisdiction in Minnesota by Baab, Carole Lofness
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 7
1990
Current Status of Personal and General Jurisdiction
in Minnesota
Carole Lofness Baab
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Baab, Carole Lofness (1990) "Current Status of Personal and General Jurisdiction in Minnesota," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 16:
Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss1/7
STUDENT NOTE
CURRENT STATUS OF PERSONAL AND GENERAL
JURISDICTION IN MINNESOTA
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 309
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION ............................... 311
A. Personal Jurisdiction History ...................... 311
B. Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Decisions 313
C. Minnesota Personal Jurisdiction Analysis ........... 319
1. Minnesota Judicial Analysis ................... 319
2. Minnesota Long-Arm Statutes ................ 322
II. ROLE OF GENERAL JURISDICTION IN PERSONAL
JURISDICTION CLAIMS ................................. 328
A. United States Supreme Court Examines General
Jurisdiction ..................................... 328
B. Minnesota Examines General Jurisdiction ........... 332
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSERTING PERSONAL
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION ........................ 337
A. Procedure ....................................... 337
B. Strategy ........................................ 339
C ONCLUSION ............................................ 341
INTRODUCTION
Minnesota's long-arm statutes have been effective for nearly
forty years.' During this time, these statutes have provided a
basis for determining personal jurisdiction guidelines. How-
ever, recently the Minnesota appellate courts, the Minnesota
Federal District Courts, and the United States Supreme Court
have handed down a number of personal jurisdiction decisions
affecting the interpretation of these statutes. These decisions
have altered the personal jurisdiction standards to the point
where practicing attorneys may no longer realize what exactly
is required to establish jurisdiction.
The concept of "general" jurisdiction has become the focus
1. MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1988) (amended 1978) (effective date May 16, 1967,
1967 Minn. Laws Ch. 427, § 1); MINN. STAT.§ 303.13, subd. 1 (3) (1988 & Supp.
1989) (subdivision 1 (3) was effective April 21, 1957, 1957 Minn. Laws Ch. 538, § 1).
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of extensive debate and is viewed by some commentators as
"one of the most intriguing developments in judicial analysis
of personal jurisdiction over the last five years... "2 The cate-
gories of general and specific jurisdiction, at present, remain
vague and confusing. In 1988, the Minnesota Federal District
Court addressed the issue of general jurisdiction in two signifi-
cant cases. 3 Although these decisions offer some guidance in
distinguishing between general and specific jurisdiction, the
present status and scope of general jurisdiction remains un-
clear. Without sufficient direction from higher courts, the
lower courts have been unable to come to a consensus as to
what is necessary to establish general jurisdiction.
4
This comment will examine the expansion of personal juris-
diction law by outlining the history of personal jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction, concentrating on decisions which have
modified those jurisdictional standards. The comment will
also interpret Minnesota's long-arm statutes, and the recent
conflict concerning general jurisdiction. Finally, this comment
will discuss the practical implications of recent personal and
general jurisdiction decisions, including both the procedural
and tactical aspects.
2. Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 610 (1988).
The terms general and specific jurisdiction "have become the touchstones of contem-
porary personal jurisdiction analysis." Id. at 611. See also Brilmayer, A General Look at
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988). The Editor states that specific juris-
diction has received most scholars' attention, "leaving general jurisdiction a powerful
yet largely unexplored theory." Id. at 723.
General jurisdiction involves suits in which a defendant is engaged in continuous
forum related activity; however, its cause of action does not arise from that activity.
Specific jurisdiction concerns cases where the cause of action arises from origins re-
lated to the defendant's activity. General jurisdiction is established by regular, sys-
tematic and continuous contacts; while specific jurisdiction is satisfied by the
minimum contacts test. Twitchell, supra, at 610. See D. CRUMP, W. DORSANEO, 0.
CHASE & R. PERSCHBACHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 71 (1987).
3. Larson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1988). This court
also found sufficient connection between the defendant's contact with the forum and
the plaintiff's cause of action to justify personal jurisdiction under Minnesota statute
§ 543.19. The court denied the defendant's motion to transfer to Iowa District
Court. Id. at 1278. In Hoppe v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Minn.
1988), the court found a sufficient connection between the defendant's forum contact
and the plaintiff's cause of action to justify personal jurisdiction under Minnesota
statute § 543.19. However, the case was transferred to New York Federal District
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 404 (a). Id. at 1272.








A. Personal Jurisdiction History
Personal jurisdiction concerns the court's power over a per-
son, in most cases the defendant, 5 whereas subject matter ju-
risdiction refers to the court's power to hear and determine a
case, as defined by the state's constitution and legislation.6
The original notions of personal jurisdiction began over a cen-
tury ago when the United States Supreme Court referred to
the doctrine of territoriality in Pennoyer v. Neff.
7
It was not until over sixty-five years later in 1945 that the
United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 made a move toward broadening
a state's personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 9 Inter-
national Shoe set forth the "minimum contacts" standard, l0
which to this day is articulated in nearly every personal juris-
diction decision. In the Court's often quoted words:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' 1
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (5th ed. 1979).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (5th ed. 1979).
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Exercising jurisdiction over the defendant was based
upon either actual physical presence within the court's jurisdiction or the defendant's
consent to the court's jurisdiction over her. Id. at 734. The Supreme Court referred
to this as the doctrine of territoriality, in that a state court could assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant was located within
the forum's territorial boundaries. Id. at 722-23. The doctrine was also referred to
as the sovereign power theory, where the sovereign has authority over anything
within its borders and nothing outside of them. Id.
The Pennoyer Court stated that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was violated where a court rendered a personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant without having jurisdiction over that defendant. Id. at 733.
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court did not overrule Pennoyer's doctrine of terri-
toriality, but instead retained only a trace of territoriality necessary to satisfy due
process requirements.
10. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
11. Id. Minimal contacts are defined as:
That doctrine ofjurisdiction which provides that before a foreign cor-
poration is subject to suit in a state such corporation's activity within the
state must meet basic activity requirements. For nonresident to be subject
to state's personal jurisdiction, he must have certain minimum contacts with
1990]
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The Supreme Court held, in general, that a corporation con-
ducting business in the forum, which has availed itself of the
benefits and protections of the forum state's laws must also
bear certain risks, including the risk of litigation.' 2
It was another ten years before the Supreme Court ex-
panded the scope of state jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 13 established that
due process is not violated when a state asserts personal juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant on the basis of a single or
isolated transaction. 1
4
state such that maintenance of suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, and this is the "minimum contacts principle."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 897-98 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
In International Shoe, the Court added that the demands of due process, "may be
met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reason-
able, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation
to defend the particular suit which is brought there." 326 U.S. at 317. An estimation
of the inconvenience a foreign defendant would incur in a trial away from home is
relevant. However, such considerations of convenience may not be acceptable as a
substitute for the constitutional necessity of "minimum contacts" with the forum
state. Id.
The minimum contacts standard has also received some criticism. Justice Black
wrote a concurring opinion in International Shoe asserting that the minimum contacts
standard was highly subjective and difficult to apply. "There is strong emotional ap-
peal in the words 'fair play,' justice,' and 'reasonableness' . . . [blut they were not
chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution .. " Id. at 325.
The Supreme Court in 1978 explained the ease by which the minimum contacts
test could be applied:
Like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness,"
the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of
mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to
determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present. We
recognize that this determination is one in which few answers will be written
"in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the
shades are innumerable."
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citations omitted).
12. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
13. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
14. Id. at 223. The Supreme Court in McGee sustained state jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation, solely on the basis of a single insurance contract made with a
resident of the forum state. Id. The corporate defendant's only contact with the
forum was its assumption of an insurance policy and receipt of payments on the pol-
icy entered into with a forum resident. The Court did put great emphasis on the
nature of the contract, because it was one of insurance. Id. The McGee Court added
that social conditions of the times suggested a less restrictive standard of personal
jurisdiction than had been acceptable in the past:
Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may in-
volve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationali-
zation of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transporta-
[Vol. 16
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The Court held that it is enough that the suit be based on a
single contract having substantial contacts with the state.' 5
The McGee Court emphasized the importance of the forum's
interest in protecting its residents and the relative convenience
of the forum as well as the International Shoe standards.' 6
In the following term, the Supreme Court suggested a limi-
tation on the minimum contacts standard. In Hanson v.
Denckla, 17 the Supreme Court held that more is required than
mere "unilateral activity" with the nonresident defendant is re-
quired to establish personal jurisdiction ti The defendants
must also "purposefully avail" themselves to the advantages of
the forum state. 19 The hidden result was to limit the potential
reach of McGee.
B. Recent Supreme Court Personal Jursdiction Decisions
From 1958, when Hanson was decided, until 1977, the
Supreme Court did not issue any major decisions in the area of
personal jurisdiction. Since 1977, it has issued eleven such de-
cisions. 20 These decisions, however, do not set forth clear
tion and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.
Id. at 222-23.
15. Id. at 223.
16. Id. at 223-24.
17. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
18. Id. at 253. In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court specified that the factors added by
McGee could not be considered unless the "minimum contacts" standard was already
satisfied. Id. at 251-53.
19. Id. "The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State."
Id. at 253. The nonresident defendant must, purposefully avail "itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws." Id. (citations omitted).
The Hanson decision has received some criticism for its abstract and ambiguous
concepts, such as "purposefully avail," used in attempting to limit personal jurisdic-
tion. See sources cited in Due Process and Long Arm Jurisdiction in Minnesota: A Criticism of
the Minimum Contacts Standard, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 298 n.80 (1979) [herein-
after Due Process].
20. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (in an interna-
tional context, mere awareness on the part of foreign defendant that components
would enter stream of commerce in forum state is insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (each class mem-
ber's claim must have "a significant contact or aggregation of contacts" to the forum
state); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (forum state may assert
personal jurisdiction where defendant's actions are purposely directed to forum resi-
dents even if defendant does not physically enter forum); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (regular purchases in the forum state
1990]
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standards for assertion of personal jurisdiction. Four com-
monly cited Supreme Court cases establish new standards in
personal jurisdiction. In 1980, the United States Supreme
Court again clarified the "minimum contacts" doctrine and
adopted the "stream of commerce" theory for products liabil-
ity cases in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 21 The prod-
ucts liability claim filed in Oklahoma against a New York
automobile retailer and wholesaler, involved a vehicle
purchased in New York and a collision which occurred while
the vehicle was being driven through Oklahoma. 22 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a six to three deci-
sion, reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision that
personal jurisdiction was established by Oklahoma's "long-
arm" statute.2 3 The Court held that the contacts between the
vehicle retailer and wholesaler and the State of Oklahoma were
insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. 24 In essence, the Court sep-
arated the minimum contacts standard into two requirements.
First, the jurisdiction must be reasonable.25 Second, the juris-
diction must be based on minimum contacts between the de-
fendant and the forum state.26
are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation
when the purchases are unrelated to the cause of action against the nonresident);
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (forum state may assert personal jurisdiction if
intentional conduct outside of forum is calculated to cause injury to forum resident);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (defendant's regular circula-
tion of magazines in forum state is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction in a libel
action based on the magazine's contents); Insurance Corp. of Ireland Ltd. v.
Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction may be waived and a nonresident may be estopped from raising it under
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (state cannot
make bindingjudgment on defendant where state has no contacts, ties, or relations);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (minimum contacts
necessary for state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident, non-domiciliary parent in a child support action violated due
process); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (presence of defendant's property
in forum state is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction if property is unrelated
to the litigation).
21. 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
22. Id. at 288. The members of the family riding in the vehicle, residents of New
York, were injured after being hit by another vehicle.
23. Id. at 291.
24. Id. at 299.
25. Id. at 292.
26. Id. at 294. The Court pointed out that due process considerations prohibit a
state from taking jurisdiction over "an individual or corporate defendant with which
the state has no contacts, ties or relations." Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
[Vol. 16
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. introduced the standard that a
corporation is subject to the personal jurisdiction of a forum
state if it delivers its products into the "stream of com-
merce." 27 However, the Court found that even though it was
foreseeable that a vehicle sold by the New York wholesaler or
retailer might find its way to Oklahoma, that alone was not suf-
ficient to support jurisdiction. 28 The Court stated that absent
some purposeful availment by the nonresident defendant of
the " 'privilege[s] of conducting activities in the forum State,' "
due process does not allow the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over the nonresident defendant solely based on the plain-
tiff's "unilateral" activity over which the defendant has no
control.
29
Under a strict application of the World- Wide Volkswagen hold-
ing, the fact that a defendant placed its product into the
"stream of commerce" would not subject the defendant to per-
sonal jurisdiction absent some advance knowledge or clear in-
tention by the defendant that the product would be used in the
forum state. The World- Wide Volkswagen decision has been used
by the Minnesota Supreme Court to limit the expansion of
state courts' jurisdiction by emphasizing the relevancy of terri-
toriality and de-emphasizing the importance of fairness to the
defendant. 30
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Also, "[t]he protection against inconvenient
litigation is typically described in terms of'reasonableness' or 'fairness.' " Id. at 292.
27. "The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum State." Id. at 297-98.
28. Id. at 298. The Court explained that:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likeli-
hood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
The Court reasoned in World-Wide Volkswagen, that there must be a "degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit." Id. The majority believed that the dealer and retailer
did not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Oklahoma even though they
were dealing with a product designed to be highly mobile. Id. at 295.
29. Id. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
30. West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 678-79 (Minn. 1983).
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin border city vendor of intoxi-
cating liquor did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Minnesota when the
1990]
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In 1985, the United States Supreme Court in Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol) v. Hall held that a Colombian
helicopter corporation's contacts with Texas were insufficient
to satisfy the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, the Texas court could not exercise personal juris-
diction over the Colombian corporation. 3' The majority di-
vided its holding into two sections. First, purchases occurring
at regular intervals did not satisfy the state's assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in an action
unrelated to those purchases. Second, sending personnel to a
forum state for training related to those purchases did not in-
crease the Colombian corporation's contacts with that forum
state. 32 The dissent strongly disagreed, stating that the Co-
lombian corporation's contacts with the forum were directly
related to the underlying cause of action by the corporations
act of "purposefully availing" itself of the benefits and protec-
tions of the forum state.
33
vender sold alcohol to an eighteen-year old Minnesota resident who, on returning
home, had an automobile accident in Minnesota. Id. at 680-81. See Hanson v. John
Blue Co., 389 N.W.2d 523, 528 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (Alabama corporation did not
have sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota where the basis for jurisdiction was
that the product causing the injury passed through Minnesota on its way to Wiscon-
sin).
The court in West Am. Ins. Co. refers to Rush v. Savchuk, decided the same day as
World-Wide Volkswagen. Rush involved the issue of whether a state could exercise juris-
diction over a defendant with no forum contacts by looking to the defendant's in-
surer who was licensed to do business in the state and had a duty to defend and
indemnify its insured. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980). The United States
Supreme Court held that jurisdiction did not exist. Id. at 333. Following World-Wide
Volkswagen and Rush, the critical focus in any jurisdictional analysis must be on " 'the
relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation.' " Rush, 444 U.S. at
327 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
31. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol) v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
419 (1984). Helicol is a Colombian helicopter corporation providing transportation
for an oil and construction company headquartered in Texas and working on a pipe-
line in Peru. A helicopter crashed in Peru in 1976, killing four people. Id. at 409-10.
Representatives of the deceased filed suit in Texas and Helicopteros moved to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion was denied and the jury awarded
over $1,140,000 to representatives of the deceased. Id. at 412. The case was reversed
by the Texas Court of Appeals and reversed again by the Supreme Court of Texas.
Id. at 409. The decision of the Supreme Court of Texas was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 419.
32. The majority found that the Colombian company's contacts were insufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction. The contacts consisted of: purchasing helicopters,
equipment and training services in Texas; sending personnel to Texas for training
and for contract negotiations; and accepting into its New York bank account checks
from a Texas bank. Id. at 416. See Helicol, infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 423-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that:
[Vol. 16
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A year later, the United States Supreme Court in Burger King
Corp. v, Rudzewicz held that a Michigan resident, who entered
into a franchise agreement with a corporation headquartered
in Miami, had subjected himself to the personal jurisdiction of
Florida in two ways: first, by establishing a substantial, continu-
ing relationship with the Miami headquarters, and second, by
receiving notice from the contract agreements and the fair
course of dealing, that he may be subjected to suit in Florida.34
Justice Brennan quoted all the minimum contacts standards by
pointing out that personal jurisdiction is justified where the
cause of action "arises out of" or "relates to actions" of the
nonresident defendant that are "purposely directed" toward
the forum state's residents, and which do not offend the notion
of "fair play and substantial justice." 35 Burger King has been
criticized as relying on ambiguous legal conclusions without
providing specific definitions, which does not help a potential
defendant predict how each court will interpret the jurisdic-
tional requirements.
3 6
In Burger King, the Court used the term "substantial connec-
tion" to describe the relationship necessary between the de-
fendant and the forum state. 37 Even though the defendant did
not have offices in Florida, nor had he ever visited the state,
the Court pointed out that the dispute "grew directly out of a
by relying on a precedent whose premises have long been discarded, and by
refusing to consider any distinction between controversies that "relate to" a
defendant's contacts with the forum and causes of action that "arise out of"
such contacts, the Court may be placing severe limitations on the type and
amount of contacts that will satisfy the constitutional minimum.
Id. at 420.
34. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985). The majority
opinion in Burger King was written by Justice Brennan who had dissented in Hanson v.
Denckla, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Helicol. Justice Brennan recognized the concept
of "purposeful availment," and pointed out the distinction between general and spe-
cific jurisdiction.
35. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
36. See Quest For A Bright Line Personal Jurisdiction Rule in Contract Disputes-Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 61 WASH. L. REV. 703 (1986):
However, it is virtually impossible for a potential defendant to predict how a
judge will characterize a particular activity. As a result, contracting parties
have inadequate information on which to base decisions about where and
when to conduct their commercial activities if they want to avoid subjecting
themselves to suit in a particular forum.
Id. at 722.
37. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
1990]
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contract which had a substantial connection with that state."3 8
Personal jurisdiction was also satisfied in Florida because the
defendant failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that state
would be "fundamentally unfair." 3 9 According to the dissent,
however, it would be extremely unfair to the defendant who
would be unable to afford the costs of a suit in Florida, coupled
with the difficulty and expense of calling Michigan witnesses to
the state. 40
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court was able to tackle
the personal jurisdiction issue again in Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Ct.4 1 For the first time, the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether foreign nonresidents were subject to a
different test in establishing personal jurisdiction than that
used for American nonresidents. The Court reversed the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision, concluding that the state
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Japanese cor-
poration would be in violation of the due process clause. 42
The majority centered on the uniqueness of a personal juris-
diction conflict in an international context and the special bur-
dens that would be placed on the international defendant in
such a setting.43 The Court held that even though the Japa-
nese corporation knew that some of its products would be used
in automobile tires sold in California, the facts still did not es-
tablish the necessary minimum contacts for California to assert
personal jurisdiction consistent with the principles of "fair play
and substantial justice." 44
The holding in Asahi Metal Industry demonstrated that mini-
mum contacts are obviously necessary, but are not sufficient to
38. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479 (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
39. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985).
40. ld. at 489-90. The majority chose not to consider the fact that Burger King
could easily afford the costs of litigation in the defendant's home state and instead
focused on the defendant's actions to "deliberately 'reach[ed] out beyond' Michigan
and negotiate with a Florida corporation .... " Id. at 479 (quoting Travelers Health
Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)).
41. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
42. Id. at 108, 116.
43. Id. at 114.
44. Id. at 116. The Japanese corporation did not "purposefully avail" itself to
the California market. The mere placement of a product into the stream of com-
merce is not such an act as to warrant the minimum contacts necessary in an action
"purposefully directed" to the forum state. Id. at 112.
[Vol. 16
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satisfy the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction. 45
For the first time since adopting the "purposeful availment"
standard, the Asahi Metal Industry Court denied personal juris-
diction to a defendant who "purposely availed itself of [only]
the benefits and burdens of doing business in the forum." 4 6
The Court was "[u]nable to agree on the minimum contacts
issue," 47 and shifted its focus from the stream of commerce
argument to prohibiting jurisdiction "under the reasonable-
ness element of the International Shoe standard .. *"48 It was
considered unfair to subject the foreign defendant corporation
to personal jurisdiction in the United States for placing its
products into the general "stream of commerce," rather than
the specific stream of commerce of the forum state.
The Minnesota courts were monitoring the changes and ad-
ditions to the standards of personal jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court. At the same time, however, the courts in Min-
nesota were establishing their own guidelines in an attempt to
clarify the personal jurisdiction process.
C. Minnesota Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
1. Minnesota Judicial Analysis
State and Federal Courts in Minnesota have set forth what
has now become known as the "Five Factor Test." This test
uses the minimum contacts standard established by the United
States Supreme Court and examines the constitutionality of
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. 49  The five factors
45. See Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of PersonalJurisdiction: A Comment
on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L. J. 669.
"Asahi Metal Indus. Co. thus clearly establishes that the existence of minimum contacts
is a necessary but not sufficient condition to satisfy the constitutional requirements
for personal jurisdiction. In all cases, the court must also test the facts against equita-
ble notions of 'fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 681.
46. Id. at 679.
47. The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 261
(1987). The case "alters the focus of debate in stream-of-commerce cases. Because
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. left unresolved the longstanding disagreement over what consti-
tutes minimum contacts in such cases, the case will encourage lower courts to deny
jurisdiction on the ground of unreasonableness alone whenever possible." Id. at 265.
See also Jurisdiction: Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations-Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court of California, 29 HARV. INT'L. I.J. 207 (1988).
48. The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 47, at 261.
49. The courts use these five factors to determine whether International Shoe's
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are adhered to, while assert-
1990]
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first set forth in Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.,50 are: (1) the
quantity of the contacts; 5' (2) the nature and quality of the con-
tacts; 52 (3) the source and connection of the claim with those
contacts; 53 (4) the interest of Minnesota in providing a forum
for litigation of the dispute;54 and (5) the convenience of the
parties. 55
ing personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See supra note 11 and accom-
panying text.
50. 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965). The five factors were first identified in
Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., by Justice Blackmun who was an Eighth Circuit judge at
the time.
51. Id. at 197. To determine whether the quantity of the contacts is sufficient,
courts look at those contacts between the nonresident defendant and the state that
are both related and unrelated to the claim. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank .v. White, 420 F.
Supp. 1331, 1334-35 (D. Minn. 1976) (no personal jurisdiction where related con-
tacts with forum were only through an agency and the unrelated contacts with state
were through a loan transaction and written agreement with the state); American
Pollution Prevention Co. v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 304 Minn.
191, 195, 230 N.W.2d 63, 65 (1975).
A single contact may be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. However, in
that case the quality and nature of that single contact becomes dispositive. Johnson
v. Sel-Mor Distributing Co., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978)).
52. Aftanase, 343 F.2d at 197. The courts examine the quality and nature of the
contacts by describing the defendant's contact and determining the potential effect of
the contact in the state. The more routinely and regularly a nonresident defendant
conducts business with the state, the greater the nature and quality of those contacts.
See, e.g., Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 295-98, 240 N.W.2d
814, 817-19 (1976); American Pollution Prevention Co., 304 Minn. at 195, 230 N.W.2d at
66.
53. Aftanase, 343 F.2d at 197. This factor relates to the connection between the
contacts with the state and the cause of action. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). A defendant's connection with the
forum must be such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into
court in that forum. Id. Hardrives, Inc., 307 Minn. at 298, 240 N.W.2d at 819. The
contact does not have to be a direct cause of the action in order to constitute an
adequate source and connection. It is sufficient that the consequences of the act were
foreseeable. However, it is not essential to find a contact related to the cause of
action if contacts are substantial with respect to quantity and quality. Id.
54. Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965). The
state's interest in the litigation is strong when the claims if pursued out of state would
be unlikely to be heard. Cf. Northern States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311
Minn. 368, 374, 249 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976); Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Highway Trailer Indus., Inc. 291 Minn. 251, 255-56, 190 N.W.2d 670, 674 (1971).
55. Afianase, 343 F.2d at 197. The convenience of the parties is analyzed by bal-
ancing the interests of the plaintiff in having the case tried in a particular forum
against the inconvenience of the nonresident defendant in defending in the plaintiff's
forum. The convenience is generally measured by examining the travel involved and
the location of the witnesses and evidence. See, e.g., B & J Mfg. Co. v. Solar Indus.,
Inc., 483 F.2d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Kiekhaefer, 372 F. Supp. 715,
720 (D. Minn. 1973); Independent School Dist. No. 454 v. Marshall Stevens Co., 337
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The Five Factor Test is not intended to be "mechanically ap-
plied." 56 Instead, the courts generally hold that the first three
factors receive primary consideration and the last two, because
of their subject matter, receive secondary consideration. 57
State and federal courts in Minnesota almost universally em-
ploy the Five-Factor Test in conflicts of personal jurisdiction.58
The test serves as an appropriate balance between contra-
dicting policies of controlling those activities affecting state
residents, while at the same time, controlling unreasonable ju-
risdictional claims over nonresidents. 59 "When the question is
close [regarding whether the court can exercise personal juris-
diction over a defendant] doubts are to be resolved in favor of
jurisdiction. 60
Courts applying Minnesota law have followed two guidelines
when analyzing personal jurisdiction.61 First, courts consider
F. Supp. 1278, 1288-89 (D. Minn. 1971) (convenience of the parties is only relevant
if the defendant suffers "exceptional hardship" or an "inordinate burden"). Frank-
lin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 297 Minn. 181, 184-85, 210 N.W.2d 227, 230
(1973) (factor five is only dispositive if the inconvenience to either party is extensive);
Johnson v. Sel-Mor Distributing Co., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
56. Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1987).
"[A]pplication of these factors does not provide a slide rule by which fundamental
fairness can be ascertained with mathematical precision." Id. (quoting Toro Co. v.
Ballis Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978)).
57. Austad Co., 823 F.2d at 226. See also Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. American
Compressed Steel Co., 564 F.2d 1206, 1210 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977); Gardner Eng'g
Corp. v. Page Eng'g Co., 484 F.2d 27, 31 (8th Cir. 1973); Marquette Nat'l Bank v.
Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978).
58. See, e.g., Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338,
1340 (8th Cir. 1983); Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., 332 N.W.2d 904,
907 (Minn. 1983); Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn. 1982); Kopperud v.
Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Minn. 1981); Ulmer v. O'Malley, 307 N.W.2d 775, 777
(Minn. 1981); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978);
Sausser v. Republic Mortgage Investors, 269 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1978); North-
ern States Pump & Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 373, 249 N.W.2d 182,
186 (1976); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 301, 240 N.W.2d
814, 820 (1976); State v. Hartling, 360 N.W.2d 439, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Mid-
west Medical, Inc. v. Kremmling Medical-Surgical Assoc., 352 N.W.2d 59, 60 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984).
59. See Due Process, supra note 19, at 304.
60. Olmsted County v. Trailer Equip. Warehouses, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 395, 397
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (court used the Five-Factor Test and found insufficient con-
tacts for jurisdiction).
61. Larson v. Association of Apt. Owners of Lahaina Shores, 606 F. Supp. 579,
581 (D. Minn. 1985) (attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction in Minnesota over
Hawaiian defendants for injuries suffered by plaintiff in Hawaii violated due process
and requirements of the long-arm statute). See also Sherburne County Social Serv. ex
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whether the facts of the disputed case satisfy the state long-arm
statute.62 If the facts do not fall within the standards of the
long-arm statute, then the state may not assert personal juris-
diction over the nonresident. Second, if the facts do fall under
the state long-arm statute, courts consider whether personal
jurisdiction would be consistent with the due process require-
ments. 63 The courts by applying this two step process are
striving toward consistency in personal jurisdiction decisions.
Although the two-step process provides guidance, decisions by
the Minnesota courts are included in the personal jurisdiction
confusion.
2. Minnesota Long-Arm Statutes
In response to the more flexible minimum contacts stan-
dards, many state legislatures have enacted personal jurisdic-
tion statutes or long-arm statutes. 64 The due process standard
is most often incorporated within the interpretation of the
state long-arm statutes. 65 Generally, all long-arm statutes pro-
rel Pouliot v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1988) (single sexual encounter
in Minnesota insufficient to establish minimum contacts in a paternity action);
Wheeler v. Teufel, 443 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (no personal jurisdic-
tion where an Arizona resident's alleged defamatory statements by telephone from
Arizona to Minnesota did not qualify as an act occurring in Minnesota under the
long-arm statute); Johnson v. Sel-Mor Distributing Co., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 495, 496
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Wisconsin distributor had insufficient contacts with Minne-
sota for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute and due process clause);
Brown County Family Serv. Center v. Miner, 419 N.W.2d 117, 118-19 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (ownership of property in Minnesota alone is not enough to establish
jurisdiction).
62. Larson, 606 F. Supp. at 581.
63. Id. at 581-82.
64. Long-arm statutes are defined as:
Various state legislative acts which provide for personal jurisdiction, via sub-
stituted service of process, over persons or corporations which are nonresi-
dents of the state and which voluntarily go into the state, directly or by
agent, or communicate with persons in the state, for limited purposes, in
actions which concern claims relating to the performance or execution of
those purposes. ...
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 849 (5th ed. 1979).
65. Mid-West Medical, Inc. v. Kremmling Medical-Surgical Assoc., 352 N.W.2d
59, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). "Minnesota interprets its long arm statute . . . to
extend personal jurisdiction in its courts to the limits of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. See also David M. Rice, Inc. v. Intrex, Inc., 257 N.W.2d
370, 372 (Minn. 1977) (personal jurisdiction asserted over nonresident defendants
where a long-arm statute is applied to satisfy constitutional due process principles).
See generally Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reap-
praisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429 (1981) (author objects to the "defendant oriented" ap-
proach of the current personal jurisdiction determination).
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vide a means for service of process on a nonresident defend-
ant, who has either committed an act in the state, or an act
outside the state, which actually affects the state.66 A state
court may narrowly construe its long-arm statute and refuse to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. Federal
courts are then bound by a state court's interpretation of its
own long-arm statute.67
Both the federal courts and the Minnesota state courts have
asserted on numerous occasions that the scope of the long-arm
statutes is intended to expand the Minnesota courts' reach
over nonresidents to the maximum amount consistent with
due process. 68 The determination of whether jurisdiction is
66. See Due Process, supra note 19, at 312. The principles of the long-arm statutes
are the same, whether the cause of action occurs in the forum state or the cause of
action occurs outside the forum, but somehow affects that forum.
67. "[T]o the extent that state courts might give a long-arm statute a more lim-
ited construction than federal due process requires, a federal court is bound by that
construction, even though the Fourteenth Amendment might permit a broader con-
struction." Annotation, Products Liability: In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Man-
ufacturer or Seller under 'Long-Arm" Statutes, 19 A.L.R.3d 13, 25 (1968) [hereinafter
Annotation, Products Liability--Jurisdiction] (footnote omitted). See Mechanical Con-
tractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of N. Cal., Inc., 342
F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1965). "[W]e are governed by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of California as to the scope and meaning of the California Statute." Id.
68. The federal cases include: Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus. Inc.,
708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir. 1983) (Minnesota mattress manufacturer lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over Virginia corporation under the state long-arm statutes); Toro
Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1269 (8th Cir. 1978) (no jurisdiction
over Texas corporation where only contacts with Minnesota were "wholly unrelated"
to the claim); B &J Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Solar Indus., 483 F.2d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 1973)
(liberal construction of Minn. Stat. § 543.19 to determine whether cause of action
arises from business transaction in state).
Minnesota cases stating that the long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction
to maximum limits permitted by due process include: Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372
N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 1985) (company's contracts and marketing efforts to estab-
lish a national market are sufficient contacts for Minnesota jurisdiction); Vikse v.
Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. 1982) (fiduciary obligations regarding a mort-
gage satisfaction are sufficient contacts for jurisdiction); Northern States Pump &
Supply Co. v. Baumann, 311 Minn. 368, 374, 249 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976) (lease of
equipment and visits to state support assertion of jurisdiction consistent with due
process); State ex. rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 441, 216 N.W.2d 140, 143
(1974) (more than an allegation of fatherhood is required to convey jurisdiction);
Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R., 297 Minn. 181, 183, 210 N.W.2d 227, 229
(1973) (maintaining office with purpose of soliciting business is sufficient contacts);
Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 111, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405 (1972) (home
office and Minnesota being focal point of all communication are sufficient contacts);
Mid-Continent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Indus., Inc., 291 Minn. 251,
254, 190 N.W.2d 670, 673 (1971) (no jurisdiction over company no longer licensed
in Minnesota when accident occurred outside Minnesota); Hunt v. Nevada State
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consistent with due process rests on the facts of each individual
case. 69 In addition, the court considers to what extent the due
process clause limits a state's power over nonresidents.7°
Minnesota presently has two long-arm statutes, sections
303.13, subd. 1 (3),71 and 543.19.72 The older service of pro-
Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 110, 172 N.W.2d 292, 311 (1969) (physical presence not needed
to commit a tortious act in state necessary to convey jurisdiction); Brown County
Family Service Center v. Miner, 419 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (tele-
phone calls and letters sent to Minnesota held insufficient to satisfy constitutional
requirements for exercise of personal jurisdiction); In re Shipowners Litigation, 361
N.W.2d 112, 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (single meeting in state and correspondence
related to meeting insufficient contacts); Thompson v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul,
360 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (sufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction
where defendant purposefully availed himself by allowing his name to be used and by
appearing at a basketball camp).
69. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (jurisdiction varies with
quality and nature of activities); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
319 (1945) (due process depends on activity in relation to fair and orderly adminis-
tration of the laws).
70. See Annotation, Products Liability-Jurisdiction, supra note 67, at 45.
71. The relevant portions of Minn. Stat. § 303.13, subd. 1 (3) provide as follows:
(3) If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota
to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota, or if a
foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Minnesota against
a resident of Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in
Minnesota by the foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of the state of Min-
nesota and his successors to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may
be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings against the foreign
corporation arising from or growing out of the contract or tort .... The
making of the contract or the committing of the tort shall be deemed to be
the agreement of the foreign corporation that any process against it which is
so served upon the secretary of state shall be of the same legal force and
effect as if served personally on it within the state of Minnesota.
MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1 (3) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
72. Minn. Stat. § 543.19 states:
Subdivision 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in
this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any non-
resident individual, or the individual's personal representative, in the same
manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a resident
of this state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the
foreign corporation or nonresident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this
state, or
(b) Transacts any business within the state, or
(c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage, or
(d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property dam-
age in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction
shall be found:
(1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or
(2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the
state's jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice; or
(3) the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy.
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cess statute, section 303.13, subd. 1 (3), applies only to foreign
corporations. The scope of section 303.13, subd. 1 (3) is nar-
rower than the personal jurisdiction statute, section 543.19,
which applies to both foreign corporations and nonresident in-
dividuals. Also, the personal jurisdiction statute, unlike the
older foreign corporation statute, does not require the plaintiff
to be a Minnesota resident. Despite the obvious differences in
the language, courts have not distinguished the application of
the personal jurisdiction statute from the service of process
statute.
73
While section 543.19 asserts personal jurisdiction over non-
residents in a broad range of situations, section 303.13 subd. 1
(3), a single-act statute,74 is much more restricted in its applica-
tion. Single-act statutes, adopted in a large number of states,
75
expand jurisdiction over nonresidents in the case of an isolated
act done by the nonresident within the forum state. In Minne-
sota, under the single-act statute it is generally required that a
portion of the tort occurs within the state. 76 If a tort does oc-
cur within the state, a nonresident corporation may be served
through a resident agent or if there is no resident agent,
Subd. 2. The service of process on any person who is subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be made
by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this state
with the same effect as though the summons had been personally served
within this state.
Subd. 3. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in subdivi-
sion 1 may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction
over the defendant is based upon this section.
Subd. 4. Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to
serve any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law or
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
Subd. 5. Nonresident individual, as used in this section, means any indi-
vidual, or the individual's personal representative, who is not domiciled or
residing in the state when suit is commenced.
MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1988).
73. Due Process, supra note 19, at 314 (footnote omitted).
74. See Annotation, Products Liability-Jurisdiction, supra note 67, at 21.
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 48-171 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-
209(a)(2) (1983 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(7) (1983); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1982); OtHo REV. CODE ANN. § 187
(1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24-28 (1953 & Supp. 1989).
76. See, e.g., Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165,
169-71 (D. Minn. 1969) (no personal jurisdiction where foreign corporation's only
contact with forum was that the injury occurred in the forum); Dahlberg Co. v. Amer-
ican Sound Products, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Minn. 1959) (lack of personal
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through the office of the secretary of state. 77
The personal jurisdiction statute may be applied to nonresi-
dents and may be asserted by nonresidents. 78 Under section
543.19, Minnesota courts have personal jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation transacting business in the state, as long as
the cause of action "arises from" the corporation's contact
with the state. 79 Therefore, the statute requires a connection
between the cause of action and the activity "giving rise" to the
jurisdiction.80 When the determination of whether to assert ju-
risdiction is uncertain, courts hold that doubts should be re-
solved in favor of finding jurisdiction. 8
Several Minnesota cases have interpreted the application of
the personal jurisdiction statute to foreign corporations. For
77. MINN. STAT. § 303.13, subd. 1 (2) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
78. Minnesota Statute § 543.19 includes all nonresidents, individuals, and corpo-
rations. See, e.g., Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405
(1972) (personal jurisdiction statute was applied to a nonresident director).
79. MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1 (1988). See also Concord, Inc. v. Dakota State
Bank, 595 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Minn. 1984) (Personal jurisdiction exists under the
long-arm statute when foreign corporation conducts business in the forum state and
the claim "arises from the corporation's enumerated contact with the state" (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 468 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D. Minn.
1979))); Lawson v. Darrington, 416 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(Iowa bar owner had sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota to warrant personal
jurisdiction in the state); Mid-West Medical, Inc. v. Kremmling Medical-Surgical As-
socs., 352 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (personal jurisdiction improper
where Colorado corporation did not have business arising from its contacts with Min-
nesota). Cf. NFD, Inc. v. Stratford Leasing Co., 433 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (contacts given little weight when quantity and quality of contacts do not
support claim of jurisdiction), rev. granted Feb. 10, 1989.
80. Larson v. Association of Apt. Owners of Lahaina Shores, 606 F. Supp. 579,
583 (D. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota statute § 543.19 requires connection between cause
of action and the activity "giving rise" to the jurisdiction). See also Collyard v. Wash-
ington Capitals, 477 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (D. Minn. 1979) (party must demonstrate
that defendant's action giving rise to claim arises from act enumerated in the statute);
Tunnell v. Doelger & Kirsten, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D. Minn. 1976) ("statu-
tory requirement of a nexus between the cause of action asserted and the acts of a
non-resident which can confer jurisdiction"); Real Properties, Inc. v. Mission Ins.
Co., 427 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1988) ("it is not enough that contacts are 'random',
'fortuitous' or 'attenuated' " (citations omitted)); Janssen v. Johnson, 358 N.W.2d
117, 120 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (personal jurisdiction improper where Wisconsin bar
owner's only contact with Minnesota was purchasing some supplies from the state);
Maiers Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. Chancey Trailers, 354 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (no personal jurisdiction over Florida corporation whose only contact
with the state was the sale and delivery of six trailers).
81. Helten v. ArthurJ. Evers Corp., 372 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
("doubt should be resolved in favor of retention ofjurisdiction") (quoting Hardrives,
Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 296, 240 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1976)).
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example, in Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc. ,82 the court applied both the
World-Wide Volkswagen standard and Minnesota statute section
543.19. The court found that a manufacturer who places a
product into the "stream of commerce," expecting the product
to be used in another jurisdiction, is subject to personal juris-
diction in that state.83 In 1988, however, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals held in Olmsted County v. Trailer Equipment Warehouses,
Inc., that there was no personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant where the only contact with the state was general
knowledge that the stream of commerce "might" take its prod-
uct into the state.
84
These two cases provide a good illustration that there are no
easy answers to personal jurisdiction questions. While the de-
cisions apply the same general standards, whether jurisdiction
is proper turns on the specific facts of each case.8 5 Therefore,
practicing attorneys will find inconsistent rules of law from
82. 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1985).
83. Id. at 721. Rostad involved an action by a baseball umpire against an out-of-
state manufacturer of a ring-shaped baseball bat weight. The umpire was injured
when the weight flew off a bat and hit him in the head. Sale of the bat rings to a
national distributor of sporting goods for sale throughout the United States in retail
stores, including Minnesota, was sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction. Id. at
718-19.
84. Olmsted County v. Trailer Equip. Warehouses, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 395, 398
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The defendant's sole connection to Minnesota was a trailer
hitch manufactured, sold and installed in Oklahoma, "which made its way through
the stream of commerce to Minnesota and injured a Minnesota resident." Id. at 396.
85. See Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1341
(8th Cir. 1983) (sales activity of Virginia corporation in Minnesota did not establish
personal jurisdiction over the corporation under the state long-arm statutes); Iowa
Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301, 1303 (8th Cir. 1979) (Iowa
Electric's payment, record-keeping, ordering, and notice activities in Iowa were insuf-
ficient to assert personal jurisdiction over Atlas); United States v. Advance Mach. Co.,
547 F. Supp. 1085, 1093 (D. Minn. 1982) ("whether a corporation is an instrumental-
ity or an alter ego of another corporation presents primarily an issue of fact to be
determined upon the peculiar facts of each case"); Scott v. Mego Int'l, Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 1118, 1126 (D. Minn. 1981) (personal jurisdiction is proper for parent com-
pany where companies were organized so that one company was the "instrumentality
or adjunct of the other"); Dotterweich v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 416 F. Supp. 542, 547
(D. Minn. 1976) (the positions of the two defendants must be analyzed separately to
determine where exercise ofjurisdiction is proper); Curry v. McIntosh, 389 N.W.2d
224, 228 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (no personal jurisdiction over Canadian company
where the injuries did not occur in Minnesota and the Canadian company's contacts
were insufficient); Wilkie v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986) (jurisdiction defense proper where outstate corporation committed no
act in state or outside state which caused property damage in state); Helten v. Arthur
J. Evers Corp., 372 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (shipping to plants
known to be located throughout the country should be enough to establish minimum
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similar cases, and must compile as many facts as possible re-
garding their party's own contacts to support a personal juris-
diction argument.
II. ROLE OF GENERAL JURISDICTION IN PERSONAL
JURISDICTION CLAIMS
A. United States Supreme Court Examines General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction involves suits in which a defendant is
engaged in continuous forum related activity, however, the
cause of action does not arise from that activity. 86 Specific ju-
risdiction concerns cases in which the cause of action arises
from or is related to the defendant's activity. 8 7 General juris-
diction is established by regular, systematic and continuous
contacts, while specific jurisdiction is satisfied by the standard
minimum contacts test.88 Therefore, a single, isolated contact
may, be sufficient for specific jurisdiction because the claims
have a "nexus" with the activity. 89 General jurisdiction in-
volves adjudicating a claim centered outside the forum. How-
ever, only a direct relationship between the forum and the
nonresident defendant justifies general jurisdiction. 90 In addi-
tion, the activities of the nonresident defendant must be sub-
stantial, and not sporadic or occasional, in order for the forum
state to assert jurisdiction. 91
The terms general and specific jurisdiction were created in
contacts "especially when the underlying suit arises from alleged defects in the prod-
uct itself").
86. In general jurisdiction disputes, the claim arises in "another place, and is
unrelated to the contacts with the forum." See D. Crump, W. Dorsaneo, 0. Chase &
R. Perschbacher, supra note 2, at 71.
87. In specific jurisdiction disputes, the claim is related to the contacts them-
selves. Id.
88. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48
(1952); Olsen ex. rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 649 (9th Cir.
1984); Bucks County Playhouse v. Bradshaw, 577 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
89. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8
(1984). See generally von Mehren & Trautman,Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Anal-
ysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966) (analyzes sources of general and specific
jurisdiction).
90. See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 89, at 1136-46 (author discusses
jurisdiction in actions unrelated to forum activities, but in "directly affiliating
circumstances").
9 1. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 80-81 (1981).
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reaction to evolving standards and requirements of personal
jurisdiction. 92 Professors von Mehren and Trautman first in-
troduced the two categories to provide some direction in the
various courts' attempts to recognize the importance of assert-
ingjurisdiction based on the connection between the nonresi-
dent's forum and the dispute.
93
It has been difficult for courts to apply general jurisdiction
with any consistency. Some commentators believe there are
specific reasons for the confusion.94 First, courts are unsure of
the meaning of general jurisdiction.95 Second, courts are not
in agreement about whether it is fair to assert specific jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants with some continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum, when the claim is only
"tenuously" connected to the contacts. 96 This uncertainty in-
volving specific jurisdiction has caused many courts to simply
rely on general jurisdiction as the only alternative.
In all cases, the relevant question is whether general or spe-
cific jurisdiction applies. A plaintiff attempting to apply a dis-
tant forum's law because it is more favorable, may face
difficulties in general jurisdiction cases because more contacts
are required and because of the potential difficulty in applying
a preferred forum state's law.
97
92. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 654
(1965) [hereinafter MULTISTATE PROBLEMS]; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 89,
at 1135-36. See also Twitchell, supra note 2.
93. MULTISTATE PROBLEMS, supra note 92, at 652-56, 711. General jurisdiction is
described as jurisdiction based on the relationship between the forum and one of the
parties, regardless of the nature of the dispute. Id. at 654. Specific jurisdiction is
jurisdiction based on the relationship between the forum and the controversy. Id.
Von Mehren & Trautman distinguished general and specific jurisdiction:
[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally
support only the power to adjudicate ... issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.... This we call spe-
cific jurisdiction. On the other hand, American practice for the most part is
to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is
based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the person
or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we call general
jurisdiction.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 89, at 1136.
94. Twitchell, supra note 2, at 611.
95. Id. at 611 and n.10.
96. Id. at 611 and n.ll.
97. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (decision to apply a
state's substantive law is unconstitutional if choice of that state's law is unfair or arbi-
trary, based on how the contacts between the parties, the occurrence, and the state
are connected). See also von Mehren & Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice of Law:
Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 37-39 (1982). "The Supreme
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In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court briefly
addressed the concept of general jurisdiction. 98 The Court
pointed out that there may be situations where a corporation's
continuous activities within a state may be substantial enough
to justify a cause of action "arising out of" activities entirely
unrelated to those continuous activities, without offending
traditional notions of due process. 99 Constitutional considera-
tions underlying jurisdiction requirements allow the assertion
of general jurisdiction, even in those causes of action not "aris-
ing from" the activities in the forum state.' 00
Only two cases in the Supreme Court's history have ad-
dressed general jurisdiction at any length.1OI In 1952, the
Supreme Court acknowledged general jurisdiction in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.' 0 2 The Court held that jurisdic-
tion was constitutional where the defendant's forum activities
were "continuous and systematic,"' 03 even though the claim
was unrelated to those activities and was brought by a nonresi-
dent plaintiff.'0 4 In coming to its decision, the Court listed all
the defendant's forum activities and came to the unexplained
conclusion that they were sufficient to support jurisdiction.10 5
The phrase "continuous and systematic" became the accepted
standard for general jurisdiction.10 6
Court's extreme reluctance to exercise constitutional control over state choice-of-law
practices has long been clear and is understandable." Id. at 37-38.
98. 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945).
99. Id. at 318.
100. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol) v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 (1984). The Court contrasted this with specific jurisdiction where a state
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only in a suit "arising out of" the
defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id. at 414 n.8.
101. See id. at 408; Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952).
102. 342 U.S. at 438,
103. Id. at 448. The company's mining operations, located in the Philippine Is-
lands, were shut down during the Japanese occupation of the islands during World
War II. The company's president returned to his home in Ohio. From there he
maintained the business, which included: holding directors' meetings, banking, writ-




10P See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol) v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 415 (1984). See also Olsen ex rel. Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729
F.2d 641, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); Bucks County Playhouse v. Bradshaw, 577 F. Supp.
1203, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
Sometimes courts rephrase the standard. See, e.g., Gehling v. St. George's
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The United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Helicol, also
centered on the distinction between general and specific juris-
diction. 0 7 The Court held that general jurisdiction is constitu-
tional, if the necessary contacts between the forum state and
the defendant corporation are present.10 8 The defendant in
Helicol was a Colombian corporation, that had purchased heli-
copters and parts in Texas, sent its pilots to Texas for training
and also negotiated its contract in the state.t0 9 One of the
Texas-manufactured helicopters crashed in Peru while per-
forming services under the contract.I 10 The survivors of four
American passengers killed in the crash filed suit in Texas."'
The case was complicated by the fact that the defendant was a
Columbian corporation and the accident occurred in Peru."
t 2
The Helicol controversy started in the Texas courts," t3 and
eventually found its way to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court on certiorari explained that because the
plaintiffs claim against Helicol did not "arise out of" and was
not related to Helicol's activities within the state, the only issue
concerned general jurisdiction; whether Helicol's contacts with
the forum were "continuous and systematic."' '14 The Court
listed Helicol's contacts with the forum in some detail, and
then quickly concluded such contacts were insufficient to sup-
School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 541 (3d Cir. 1985)(the standard was "contin-
uous and substantial" forum activities); Reed v. American Airlines, Inc., 197 Mont.
34, 39, 640 P.2d 912, 915 (1982) (the test was "substantial, continuous, and system-
atic" activities).
107. 466 U.S. at 414-16.
108. Id. at 414.
109. Id. at 409-11.
110. Id. at 409-10.
Ill. Id. at 410.
112. Id. at 409-10. Even though the claim did not "directly arise" out of the de-
fendant's contacts with Texas, the claim was related to those contacts. The dispute
arose out of the activity which formed the basis for Helicopteros' connections with
Texas.
113. The Texas Supreme Court held that Helicopteros had "numerous and sub-
stantial contacts," which constituted "doing business" in the state and was sufficient
for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales, 638 S.W.2d
870, 873 (Tex. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). In order to find a statutory
basis to analyze the case under general jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court had to
ignore the language of the state long-arm statute restricting jurisdiction to claims
"arising out of" the business done in the state. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art.
203 1b § 3 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-83). This statute was repealed one year after
the Supreme Court's decision. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon 1964 & Supp.
1989).
114. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 415-16.
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port general jurisdiction.15 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's decision in Helicol failed to clarify the general jurisdic-
tion theory or the contacts necessary to support general
jurisdiction.
Lower courts in nearly twenty states, including Minnesota,
have used the general jurisdiction theory to assert jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants." 6 Most of these courts seem
comfortable with the notion that specific jurisdiction is justified
in a claim related to the nonresident defendant's forum con-
tacts, as long as the defendant has sufficient contacts with the
forum. In general jurisdiction cases, the courts require more
"continuous and substantial" contacts. ' 17 The courts appear
to avoid in-depth analysis. Instead, courts simply list the non-
resident defendants' contacts, and draw conclusions about
whether those contacts qualify as general jurisdiction.118
B. Minnesota Examines General Jurisdiction
Minnesota courts have yet to expressly recognize what is
called general jurisdiction. Even though the issue has been
raised in a number of cases, it has been left unresolved. There
is disagreement in the Minnesota courts over the application of
Minnesota statute section 543.19, subdivision 3. l l9 The lan-
guage in question states that only those causes of action which
"arise from" the nonresident defendant's transaction of busi-
ness in the forum state may be asserted against a defendant
where jurisdiction is based on subdivision 1(b) of the stat-
ute.' 20 The Minnesota Supreme Court seems to suggest that
the "arising from" language does not preclude asserting juris-
diction where the defendant's contacts, although unrelated to
the cause of action, are substantial enough to reasonably ex-
pect the defendant to appear in the forum. 12 1 However, there
115. Id. at 418.
116. See Twitchell, supra note 2, at 630 for a list of states.
117. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 91; Twitchell, supra note 2.
118. See, e.g., Hoppe v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 (D. Minn.
1988); Larson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1988). See
also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 72.
120. See supra note 72.
121. See, e.g., Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 1985) (de-
fendant's sales in Minnesota weighed in favor of asserting jurisdiction); Marquette
Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1978) (defendants' borrowing
money in Minnesota favored asserting jurisdiction); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of La-
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are several Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions which have
expressly relied on the nexus requirement in subdivision 3 to
decline personal jurisdiction. 122
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized in 1985 that it
is essential in any general jurisdiction argument that the for-
eign corporation must reasonably anticipate being "haled
into" the forum state's court.' 23 This type of foreseeability is
acknowledged within the due process analysis. The court sug-
gests that it may be evidenced through substantial contacts in
the forum state. 124 Also in 1985, the Minnesota Federal Dis-
trict Court held that in order to assert personal jurisdiction
under Minnesota Statute section 543.19 and the due process
clause, the plaintiff must prove that the nonresident defendant
transacted business in the state, and that the plaintiff's injuries
"arose from" the plaintiff's activities in the state. 125
In 1986, in Busch v. Mann, a plaintiff was involved in an acci-
dent in Wisconsin and attempted to assert personal jurisdic-
tion in Minnesota based on contacts consisting of telephone
services to customers in Minnesota. 126 The Minnesota Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that personal juris-
diction could not be asserted unless the nexus requirement in
the language of section 543.19, subdivision 3 was satisfied. 27
The court in Busch acknowledged that a conflict exists between
Crosse, 307 Minn. 290, 294, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (1976) (defendants' alleged in-
spections and negotiations supported jurisdiction in Minnesota); Northwestern Nat'l
Bank of St. Paul v. Kratt, 303 Minn. 256, 261, 226 N.W.2d 910, 914 (1975) (default
on loan made by Minnesota bank enough to subject defendant to jurisdiction); Frank-
lin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 297 Minn. 181, 184, 210 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1973)
(defendant's maintenance of an office in Minnesota in order to solicit business sup-
ported jurisdiction).
122. See, e.g., Curry v. McIntosh, 389 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Hanson
v.John Blue Co., 389 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The long-arm statute was
not satisfied where the cause of action did not arise from the defendant's contacts
with Minnesota. The product inJohn Blue Co. merely passed through Minnesota in a
chain of distribution. John Blue Co., 389 N.W.2d at 525-26. Waite v. Waite, 367
N.W.2d 679, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (automobile accident in North Dakota was
"totally unrelated to respondent's contacts with Minnesota").
123. BLC Ins. Co. v. Westin, 359 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (quot-
ing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
124. See Busch v. Mann, 397 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
125. Erickson ex rel. Erickson v. Spore, 618 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (D. Minn. 1985)
(long-arm jurisdiction was lacking where the only contact was advertising in a small
out-of-state publication and the advertisement was not related to the plaintiff's deci-
sion to attend a club in the other state).
126. 397 N.W.2d at 392.
127. Id. at 394. Busch argued that even if the statutory nexus requirements of
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the Constitution, which allows general jurisdiction in a broad
range of situations, and the state long-arm statute, which
seems to limit jurisdiction to specific jurisdiction under the lan-
guage of subdivision 3.128
In Busch, the court questioned whether it must decide if
there is general jurisdiction.129 The court decided not to re-
solve this issue, but instead stated that because the plaintiff did
not show that the number of customers the defendant serviced
in Minnesota amounted to "substantial contacts" with the
state, general jurisdiction could not be asserted without violat-
ing due process concepts. 3 0 However, the stated test for gen-
eral jurisdiction is systematic, continuous contacts within the
forum, regardless of whether those contacts relate to the cause
of action.'13 In examining the facts of this case, the business of
servicing about ninety-four telephone customers would seem
to entail systematic, continuous service and, depending on the
size of the company, could also be regarded as "substantial
contacts."
The Busch decision appears to be based on the notion that
the state long-arm statutes were enacted so as to operate to the
full extent allowable under constitutional due process limita-
tions. Therefore, it seems that if faced with applying a seem-
ingly more restrictive long-arm statute and due process
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, the result would be
to apply the jurisdictional analysis set forth in the Constitution.
In 1988, a federal court in Minnesota heard two personal
jurisdiction claims dealing with general jurisdiction which in-
volved the intrauterine device manufacturer G.D. Searle & Co.
The facts in Hoppe v. G.D. Searle & Co. and Larson v. G.D. Searle
Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 3 were not met, the presence of continuous and substan-
tial contacts with the state permits the assertion of general jurisdiction. Id.
128. Id. The court noted that the discrepancy between the reach of jurisdiction
recognized by the due process provisions of the Constitution and the more restrictive
nexus requirements of Minnesota Statute § 543.19 was not resolved in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 468 F. Supp. 1132, 1144 (D. Minn. 1979). The
Medironic, Inc. court ruled that the facts of the case did not warrant a decision whether
the nexus requirement in the statute "must be met in all instances or whether general
jurisdiction may be asserted without violating the statute." Busch, 397 N.W.2d at 394
(citing Medironic, Inc., 468 F. Supp. at 1132).
129. Busch, 397 N.W.2d at 395.
130. Id. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's acts of servicing ninety-four cus-
tomers in Minnesota, was sufficient business to establish "substantial business activ-
ity." Id.
131. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 16
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss1/7
JURISDICTION
& Co. are similar in that each case involved a woman who was a
resident of a foreign state who wanted to bring a products lia-
bility claim in Minnesota. 32 Under the general jurisdiction
analysis, because the cause of action did not "arise" in Minne-
sota, both plaintiffs had to prove there were sufficient contacts
between G.D. Searle and the state.
The court in Hoppe and Larson considered whether the "aris-
ing from" requirement in Minnesota Statute section 543.19,
subdivision 3, must be met in all cases.' 33 The court attempted
at some length to explain what its answer might be and why in
this case it did not have to give an answer.
The federal district court in both Hoppe and Larson, was dis-
turbed by several factors regarding earlier Minnesota Supreme
Court opinions. The Minnesota Supreme Court had not spe-
cifically acknowledged that the language in section 543.19,
subdivision 3, using the "arising from" term, operates as a bar
to personal jurisdiction in situations where the nonresident de-
fendant has established substantial forum contacts to satisfy
the due process analysis. However, the court had suggested in
at least five cases that the language in section 543.19 does not
bar jurisdiction if the defendant's contacts with the forum
state, although not connected with the state, are meaningful to
the point that it is reasonable to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction. 1
34
132. Hoppe v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Minn. 1988) (plaintiff
Hoppe resided in New York); Larson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1277 (D.
Minn. 1988) (plaintiff Larson resided in Iowa and received medical attention in Min-
nesota on a number of occasions). The two opinions were filed only three days apart
and the analysis in the two opinions is virtually identical. The court in both decisions
found sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over G.D. Searle & Co.
Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1275; Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1282. In Hoppe, the court chose
to transfer the case to the New York district due to the inability to compel attendance
of New York witnesses. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1277. In Larson, the court decided a
transfer to Iowa district court would be inappropriate. Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1283.
133. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1272; Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1279.
134. Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1985) (nationwide con-
tracts and marketing strategies were sufficient contacts to warrant personal jurisdic-
tion over foreign manufacturer); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290
(Minn. 1978) (personal jurisdiction was justified in forum state where foreign defend-
ant actively initiated negotiations with forum bank); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of La-
Crosse, 307 Minn. 290, 240 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1976) (personal jurisdiction proper
where foreign corporation solicited bids, inspected premises on continual basis and
conducted negotiations in forum state); Northwestern Nat'l Bank of St. Paul v. Kratt,
303 Minn. 256, 226 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1975) (sufficient contacts with forum where
resident of foreign jurisdiction guaranteed loan by forum bank and transacted busi-
1990]
27
Baab: Current Status of Personal and General Jurisdiction in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
The federal district court was concerned that none of the
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions expressly acknowledged
the validity of general jurisdiction. Also, none of the decisions
condemned the nexus requirement of subdivision 3 as unnec-
essary or excessive.' 3 5 The court was also bothered by the fact
that in revising section 543.19 the legislature had the chance to
eliminate subdivision 3, yet it consciously choose to include
it. 136
The court in Hoppe and Larson concedes that if it was re-
quired to decide whether the "arising from" requirement in
section 543.19, subdivision 3 must be met in all cases, it would
hold that the plain language interpretation of the statute ad-
dresses only specific jurisdiction. The court offers two sugges-
tions: either amend the statute to expressly include the limits
of due process or have the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly
acknowledge general jurisdiction. In the occurrence of either
suggestion, the Hoppe and Larson court would then apply the
nexus requirement. 37
When addressing the issue of whether Hoppe and Larson's
causes of action indeed arose out of G.D. Searle's contact with
Minnesota, the court found a nexus in the participation of Min-
nesota physicians in the company's clinical testing of the in-
trauterine device. Currently, Minnesota has no definite
standard to determine if a cause of action has arisen from the
ness in forum state); Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 297 Minn. 181, 210
N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1973) (personal jurisdiction warranted where foreign defendant
not authorized to do business in forum had maintained office in forum at one time).
135. Hoppe v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D. Minn. 1988); Lar-
son v. G.D. Searle & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D. Minn. 1988). The court
termed the subdivision 3 nexus requirement "sUperfluous" and also pointed out that
the Texas Supreme Court expressly acknowledged general jurisdiction in U-Anchor
Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. 1977) (the case underlying
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall). Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1280.
The Eighth Circuit thus far has not confronted the long-arm nexus requirement
in Minn. Stat. § 543.19 subd. 3. The court in Hoppe cites Precision Const. Co. v.J.A.
Slattery Co., 765 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that the nexus
requirement is of primary importance in evaluating the due process factor, and is also
required under the section of the Missouri long-arm statute that is required with
subdivision 3 of Minnesota's statute. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1274.
136. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1273; Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1280. In 1978, the Min-
nesota Legislature amended § 543.19 in an apparent attempt to expand the scope of
the long-arm statute along the lines of the due process analysis. The legislature's
choice of retaining subdivision 3, however, seems contrary to that amendment. Id.
See also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
137. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1274; Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1281.
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activity in the state.' 38 The physicians' participation in G.D.
Searle's clinical testing was viewed as a "tenuous connection."
However, the court held such connection was enough to satisfy
the nexus standard in section 543.19, subdivision 3, and
enough to warrant personal jurisdiction in Minnesota. 139 A lit-
eral meaning of the word "tenuous"' 140 casts doubt as to
whether such connections should be considered sufficient, or
should be viewed as unsubstantial and inadequate.
In the future, Minnesota courts and all courts should clearly
express the policies underlying specific and general jurisdic-
tion and the proper test for distinguishing the two. Until that
happens, inconsistent treatment of personal jurisdiction by
American courts will no doubt continue.
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSERTING PERSONAL AND
GENERAL JURISDICTION
A. Procedure
A party must establish personal jurisdiction through the pro-
cedures set forth in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 14 1 When the defendant in the action is not present in the
forum state, the plaintiff may obtain jurisdiction in the method
specified by the state in which the court is located.' 42 In Min-
nesota, jurisdiction over nonresidents may be asserted under
the long-arm statutes.143
Personal jurisdiction actions usually arise when the plaintiff
attempts to bring a suit in a forum different from the defend-
ant's forum.' 44 If the nonresident defendant then challenges
138. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1274; Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1281 (citing Medtronic,
Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances, 468 F. Supp. 1132, 1144 (D. Minn. 1979). In Med-
tronic, Inc., the court, after noting that Minnesota had not developed a strong stan-
dard to follow, looked to an Illinois case that interpreted the long-arm statute
adapted by Minnesota. Medironic, Inc., 468 F. Supp. at 1144. The Illinois Court of
Appeals in Koplin v. Thomas, 73 I1. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646 (1966) stated that
"the phrase 'arising from' requires only that the plaintiff's claim be one which lies in
the wake of the commercial activities by which the defendant submitted to the juris-
diction of [the forum] courts." Id. at 252-53, 219 N.E.2d at 651 (quoted in Larson,
683 F. Supp. at 1281).
139. Hoppe, 683 F. Supp. at 1275; Larson, 683 F. Supp. at 1281.
140. "Tenuous" is defined as not substantial, flimsy. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD Dic-
TIONARY 616 (1979).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (e), (f).
143. MINN. STAT. §§ 303.13, 543.19 (1988).
144. See Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Argo Impex S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir.
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personal jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
that the appropriate state statute authorizes personal jurisdic-
tion and that the necessary "minimum contacts" exist, justify-
ingjurisdiction under due process analysis.' 45
The nonresident defendant may challenge personal jurisdic-
tion by bringing a motion to dismiss under Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure 12.02(2). 146 The defendant's motion places
the burden on the plaintiff to establish that the court has valid
jurisdiction over the defendant. 4 7 Once the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing of sufficient contacts, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a lack ofjurisdiction. 148
Under Rule 12.02(2), the court views the facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff in reviewing the defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.14 9 The defendant
must assert the lack of jurisdiction as a defense in the initial
pleading. 50 If the defendant fails to do so, she forfeits the op-
portunity to assert the defense.' 5 ' The Minnesota Supreme
1982) (plaintiff's unilateral activity in forum state was insufficient to supply personal
jurisdiction); Erickson ex rel. Erickson v. Spore, 618 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (D. Minn.
1985) (no personal jurisdiction where accident was in foreign state and only other
contact with foreign state was advertising).
145. Sausser v. Republic Mortg. Investors, 269 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1978).
146. Rule 12.02 provides in part that "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a claim for
relief in any pleading .... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be
made by motion: .. .(b) lack ofjurisdiction over the person .... MINN. R. Civ. P.
12.02.
147. Sausser, 269 N.W.2d at 761 (it is "well-settled" that plaintiff has the initial
burden of proof to show minimum contacts); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307
Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (plaintiff has burden to prove contacts justify
personal jurisdiction). See also Thompson v. Kiekhaefer, 372 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D.
Minn. 1973) (plaintiff had burden to show foreign manufacturer had sufficient con-
tacts to warrant personal jurisdiction).
148. See Mountaire Feeds, Inc., 677 F.2d at 653 (citations omitted).
149. See Schermerhorn v. Hoiland, 337 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. 1983) (court ac-
knowledged that plaintiffs might not be able to prove jurisdictional arguments at
trial, but that they should have the opportunity); 1 D. HERR AND R. HAYDOCK, MINNE-
SOTA PRACTICE § 12.06 (1985).
150. See Mississippi Valley Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Enterprises, Inc., 300 Minn. 66,
72, 217 N.W.2d 760, 764 (1974). Corporation in voluntary dissolution waived its
defense of improper service after it appeared seeking to enjoin plaintiffs from com-
mencing suit until arbitration or dissolution was complete. The fact that the corpora-
tion appealed denial of injunction and waited over sixteen months to assert defense
of improper service constituted a waiver. Id. See also Universal Constr. Co. v. Peter-
son, 280 Minn. 529, 530, 160 N.W.2d 253, 255 (1968) (where Rule 12 applied to
mechanics lien without conflict, defendant waived defense by untimely motion to
dismiss).
151. MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.08. Rule 12.08(a) states in part that "[a] defense of lack
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Court has yet to make a definite ruling as to whether a counter-




In addition to the procedural decisions involved in personal
jurisdiction actions, the parties are also confronted with nu-
merous tactical decisions concerning which available forum
will be most advantageous to their position. An attorney may
consider such things as the convenience of representing a
plaintiff in a foreign jurisdiction at trial, along with possible
attitudes and bias of local jurors toward a defendant in a for-
eign forum.15 3 For example, in products liability actions, a
party may choose a particular forum based on the court's ap-
parent attitude toward recovery. Factors such as recognizing
strict liability and the previous damage awards in similar cases
may influence a party's decision to choose one particular juris-
diction where others are available.
154
An attorney may also consider whether a state long-arm stat-
ute or court rule authorizes service of process of a nonresident
outside the territory of the forum jurisdiction. This question
concerns statutory construction controlled by individual state
law. On the other hand, whether a statute violates the due pro-
cess requirements of the United States Constitution becomes a
question of federal law.155
Not only are there tactical decisions with which a plaintiff
must be concerned, but there are also practical considerations.
For example, the plaintiff should always be conscious of the
applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff may choose to
file suit in the nonresident's domicile rather than invoke her
own long-arm statute, because of a longer statutory period.
However, she may not always receive the benefit of the foreign
jurisdiction's statute because some states enact "borrowing
statutes" 56 which require a plaintiff suing in a foreign jurisdic-
of jurisdiction over the person, . . . is waived (1) if omitted from a motion in the
circumstances described in Rule 12.07, or (2) if it is neither made by motion pursuant
to this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or amendment thereof....
152. D. Herr and R. Haydock, supra note 149, at § 12.6.
153. See Annotation, Products Liability-Jurisdiction, supra note 67, at 36.
154. Id. at 36-37.
155. Id. at 39.
156. Id. at 37.
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tion to comply with the statute of limitations of her own
jurisdiction. t57
The plaintiff should also use the pretrial discovery process to
prove personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Although it is not always necessary, it is good practice to state
in the complaint the necessary facts asserting personal jurisdic-
tion. Depending on the requirements of the state long-arm
statute, the plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction if these facts are not included.'5 8 As an extra pre-
caution, in cases that are certain to involve a personal jurisdic-
tion controversy, it is a good practice for the plaintiff to
support herjurisdictional claim with an affidavit, in addition to
stating the claim in the complaint.
One final consideration for the plaintiff, is not to rely solely
on a "single-act" statute to establish the basis for personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant.' 59 It is important to
illustrate any additional activities in the forum state which may
carry some weight in the jurisdictional decision, even though
those activities alone do not satisfy the threshold of "doing
business" in the forum state.' 60
A major consideration for the defendant is whether to bring
a personal jurisdiction claim opposing the plaintiff's forum
choice. A nonresident defendant, facing discovery, may find
the cost and inconvenience of producing records and person-
nel in a foreign state exceed any potential liability. This may
discourage a party from continuing litigation.' 6' In addition,
the defendant should take caution to avoid actions which may
be mistaken as a waiver of the defense of lack of personal juris-
diction. The defendant may be disqualified from a potential
personal jurisdiction claim by such actions as failing to file a
proper and timely motion in opposition to the jurisdiction.
Even if a defendant is unable to avoid the jurisdiction as-
serted by the plaintiff, the defendant does have several options
available. She may ask the court to decline jurisdiction based
on forum non conviens, 162 or she may make a motion under
157. Id.
158. Id. at 40.
159. Id. at 37, 42-43. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
160. See Annotation, Products Liability-Jurisdiction, supra note 67, at 42.
161. Id. at 36.
162. Forum non conveniens permits the dismissal of an action if it is brought in an
inconvenient forum and the defendant is served in another forum. See, e.g., Wil-
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the state statute for transfer of venue. A transfer of venue mo-
tion should be made only as an alternative if the motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction fails. This is used al-
ternatively because the defendant will subject herself to the
court's jurisdiction by bringing a motion for transfer of venue.
The question that arises in examining the tactical considera-
tions is whether the policies of personal jurisdiction are being
served if parties are choosing their forums on the basis of these
extraneous factors. It is possible that the vagueness of the nu-
merous standards applied in personal jurisdiction decisions
have contributed to the confusion in the practical application
of personal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This comment attempts to provide the reader with an up-to-
date analysis on the recent developments and practices of per-
sonal and general jurisdiction in Minnesota. Personal jurisdic-
tion, and specifically general jurisdiction, are governed by
ambiguous standards which lead the court to inconsistent and
sometimes unreasonable results. As a result, practioners'
knowledge and understanding of correct personal and general
jurisdiction procedure is as equally uncertain as the standards
used. Yet, it is essential to successful trial practice to have a
sufficient understanding of these jurisdictional standards, as
they are the only ones available to practioners.
With the law in its present state, the courts will continue to
evade the conflict surrounding general jurisdiction in deciding
personal jurisdiction issues. While there are a number of theo-
ries, 163 one commentator suggests limiting general jurisdiction
loughby v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 509, 511, 189 N.W.2d 165, 167
(1971) (courts may refuse to exercise jurisdiction where "it would be more equitable
that the cause of action be tried in some other available court of competent jurisdic-
tion") (quotingJohnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 79, 66
N.W.2d 763, 776 (1954)); Ramsey v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 247 Minn. 217,
219, 77 N.W.2d 176, 178 (1956) (modern transportation reduces the availability of
forum non conveniens to persons merely across state lines).
163. See, e.g., Richman, Review Essay, Part I-CasadsJurisdiction in Civil Actions; Part
Il-A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1336-46 (1984) (advocates general and specific categories in-
clude a sliding scale which examines both the defendant's forum contacts and their
connection to the plaintiff's claim); Lewis, A Brave New World For Personal Jurisdiction:
Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5-13 (1984) (suggests gen-
eral and specific categories be eliminated and replaced by a general analysis of the
defendant's expectations of the suit and the benefits received by the forum state).
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to only a defendant's forum state.' 64 This avoids the risk of
forcing a defendant to litigate in an inconvenient forum.
1 65 It
also avoids the risk of subjecting a defendant to unfair substan-
tive law.' 66 At the same time, the plaintiff is still guaranteed a
place to bring her suit.
167
In order for the Minnesota courts to provide credible and
efficient jurisdictional decisions, either the courts or the legis-
lature must clarify and redefine the principles and policies of
personal jurisdiction. In Minnesota, the first step in solving
the general jurisdiction problem should be made by the legis-
lature. The legislature should amend statute section 543.19 to
specifically enumerate the limits of due process. The courts
may be waiting for the legislature's lead before they expressly
acknowledge the validity of general jurisdiction. On the other
hand, an express acknowledgement of general jurisdiction by
the court may also bring the issue to the legislature's attention.
Thus far, the Minnesota courts have merely mentioned the
existence of general jurisdiction. An amendment to the statute
will provide the courts with direction and allow them to clarify
the practical applications of general jurisdiction. If this action
is not undertaken, excessive forum shopping and confusion by
both litigants and jurists will continue.
Carole Lofness Baab
164. Twitchell, supra note 2, at 667.
165. Id. Twitchell asserts that "[i]f the defendant is forced to defend a claim that
is not related to its forum activities in a forum other than its home base, the lack of
litigational support and the difficulty in procuring witnesses and proof may make it
much harder to defend the claim." Id.
166. Id. at 668.
167. Id. at 669. This theory also increases the probability that plaintiff may sue
multiple defendants, while providing defendants with some predictability of what ju-
risdiction to expect. Id.
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